Introduction
It is important to recognise that the definition put forward by the council of Chalcedon was a work of its time. The words used, therefore, were specific to a historical period in which perception of the man Jesus was being explored more thoroughly than perhaps the NT writers had intended. This does not immediately devalue or discount the Ecumenical declaration, in fact, the declaration provided an excellent launch pad for further Christological investigation. There are problems with the definition, but it does go some length to depict an accurate representation of the Biblical Jesus.
The need for the definition of Chalcedon
Despite the accuracy of the statement, it was never intentioned to depict Jesus in the way scripture does. Chalcedon is not a creed or a confession of faith; it is a commentary on the existing creed laid down at the Council of Nicaea in AD 325 and further revised in AD 381. It includes rebuttals of the Nestorian and Eutychian heresies and is designed to provide a greater precision to the terminology used around the incarnation.
Hooker is clear in the contrast between Chalcedon and a more functional Christology: the first intention of Chalcedon was as a ‘bastion against heresy’[1] and, on the other hand, that the NT writers were ‘primarily concerned to describe the activity of God…[and] did not try to define of the being of God or the being of Christ.’[2] In this sense a more ‘functional Christology’ is apparent within scripture, yet for Frame the contrast is not as apparent : ‘Christianity is Christ’.[3]
He follows on:
‘This phrase is a way of saying that what is most important about Christin faith is not a set of doctrines or laws or practices or liturgies, but a person…. God is personal as well as absolute.’[4]
To be more succinct, we can turn to Cullman: ‘Jesus’ uniqueness is the Christological problem.’[5] Chalcedon sought to explain a paradox, man and God, normally defined by completely divergent characteristics, found in Christ, a unique intersection. It is, therefore, central to both the Church and the follower of Christ to be clear on who Christ is. That is to say, we are not only exploring the work of Christ, but also the person. It seems, therefore, that we cannot escape exploring the nature of Christ simultaneously as we do so. Returning to Frame, he writes: ‘the personhood of our Lord does not mean that we can be indifferent to the doctrines about him’.[6]
I am He that is (Ex 3:14)
The beauty of the Chalcedon definition is that it maintains the sui generis of God; the same uniqueness that God applies to Himself in the OT. In the Exodus statement, Yahweh does not apply simile or metaphor, He states, in effect, that God is what God is. The idea of two natures, in a single person, as put forward by Chalcedon, does not alter the ontological singularity of God. Furthermore, For the statement, spoken to Moses to make sense, Yahweh must name Himself within the limiting framework of a human narrative: He tells Moses that He is the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. The Chalcedon definition also must work in a similar limiting framework: God’s revelation is only possible through mankind’s understanding, so there is a Biblical precedent in which the Church must follow. In his work, Allen writes ‘a metaphysic of participation, then, undergirds the divine workings in History – particularly the personal union in the incarnation’.[7] Is the Chalcedon declaration wholly reflective of this truth?
Is the Chalcedon Definition accurate?
The most profound and succinct Christological statement found in the Bible is the prologue to John’s Gospel; although it is a good starting point for comparison to Chalcedon, it is unwise to presuppose it is the only place in scripture to have the nature of Jesus revealed.
In an article which examines the purpose of John’s Gospel, Peltier and Lioy produce a helpful ten ‘essential emphases’ of John’s logos Christology based on their exegesis.[8] They stress the importance of the prologue:
‘[that it] is a description of Jesus Christ as the ultimate fact of the Universe…The prologue reveals the Word of God is not an attribute of God but rather the Word is pre-existent, co-equal member of the Godhead responsible for the creation of all things’.[9]
John’s prologue expresses that Jesus shares in the eternal nature of God, that he was present in both a historical and cosmological sense at the beginning of time. Chalcedon confirms this with the line ‘He was begotten before the ages from the Father according to his deity’.
John depicts the full divinity of Jesus in verse 1b - και ό λογος ἦν προς θεον, και θεος ἦν ό λογος. And the word was with God, and the word was God. Again, Chalcedon is clear in recognising the full deity of Christ where it states: ‘this same one [that is Jesus] is perfect in deity’.
The full humanity of Jesus, as defined in Chalcedon is also Biblically accurate with the consideration of John 1:14: καιόλογοςσὰρξἐγένετοκαιἐσχήνωσενἐνἠμιν; and the word came into being flesh and lived amongst us. This part of scripture is, of course, the confirmation of the incarnation of Christ, which Chalcedon accurately reflects. As Peltier and Lioy highlight, this is not a statement that Jesus ceased to be what he was before: that is fully divine; instead it suggests that something was additional to his divine being as opposed to different from it.[10] The Chalcedon use of υπόσταση, in the sense of a single person, emphasises that nothing has changed to the person of Christ neither before or after the event of the incarnation.
Problems with the Chalcedon definition
Coakley posits, that the Definition merely regulates the use of language about Christ without making any direct affirmations; that the document in general was viewed, by those who constructed it, as linguistically regulatory rather than ontological in intent.[11]Certainly there is truth that the assembled Bishops at the Ecumenical Council were neither professional philosophers nor professional theologians, and, that as previously mentioned, the driving force of the Council was to combat the emergent heresies of the day.
The crucial distinction which the document hinged upon was between the use of the words nature (physis) and hypostasis (person). Citing the work of Norris, Coakley points out that although the words are linguistically distinguished neither are given substantial content; ‘if anything is defined in the definition it is not the crucial concepts.’[12]It is problematic that the terms both had a certain historically use that can confuse the meaning without proper clarification. MacLeod picks up on this too, when he notes that the concept of the separate meanings applied at Chalcedon to the two words are alien to Greek thought: Greeks thought nature (physis) implied person for example.[13]Coakley expands that not only the concepts but also their ‘logical relation to one another’ are left undefined.[14]
Coakley levels the criticism against the definition and its apophatic theology in her conclusion: the document doesn’t define what divine and human natures consist of; it does not tell us what hypostasis means when applied to Christ; it does not elaborate how hypostasis and physis are related (or how the physes relate to one another); it does not mention how many wills Christ has; it does not explain what happens to the physes on the death and resurrection of Jesus, and finally; it does not clarify if the hypostasis differs in a Christological way from that of a Trinitarian way.[15]
Would a more functional approach to Christology answer these objections?
Scripture indicates that Mankind’s nature is essentially either body and soul; or perhaps, body, soul, and spirit. Whereas God, until the time of the incarnation at least, is spirit alone. Chalcedon relies on the biblical axiom that God and man are two different things; God and man are relational to each other but different; God defines himself in terms of man: i.e in the narrative framework of Israel or for example, in Hosea 11:9 ‘For I am God and not man, the holy one in your midst’.
This in turn enlightens us as to how the hypostasis operates within Christ: body and soul of man, (which are both scriptural requirement of the human person) are the limiting factors, but spirit of the divine, is the unlimiting factor. Jesus tires, (John 4:6) and thirsts (John 19:28); he was born in the normal human manner and learned as he grew (Luke Chapter 2), but his omnipotence is demonstrated in the ‘signs’ he performs: water into wine (John 2), the stilling of the storm (Matt 8), the miraculous provision of bread and fish (Matt 14). Grudem is clear that scripture does not attribute these works to the Holy Spirit, which can work through anyone, but that they are attributed to Jesus himself – works of the divine spirit accomplished by the man Jesus.[16]
Hebrews 1:3 instructs us that He is the exact representation of God’s glory and nature; Colossian 2:9 tells us ‘For in Him all the fullness of Deity dwells in bodily form’. Here is how nature and person relate, the nature is represented by the person.
Luke 22:52 shows us that Jesus has one will, but that it is separate from the Father’s. Therefore, two wills, by inductive reasoning must be at work within Christ, how he relates between them is by prayer, in quiet contemplation Jesus figures out what is willed (Matt 26).
After death, the person of Jesus may appear different: some instances in scripture, post resurrection, have him not being recognised; however, Luke 24:36-49 indicates his hypostasis is damaged yet recognisably bodily human and that his message, that is his nature, remains unchanged. He continues to proclaim repentance and peace.
Finally, the hypostasis cannot differ in a Christological way from that of a Trinitarian way, for if it did differentiate the hypostasis of Jesus from the hypostasis within the Trinity it would thus negate the Trinity. Chalcedon therefore maintains sound doctrine and accurately represents the biblical Jesus, it just does not do it fully; but it never could, given the brevity of the statement. If the Church is not confessing Christianity, what then, is its function? That aside, clearly more is revealed of Jesus in this approach, than could ever be revealed through Ecumenical definition.
Conclusion
There is an undeniable ambiguity to the Chalcedon definition; but in scripture we also find a certain ambiguity. There is mystery to Christianity that is not easily explained, and we must accept that as part of the biblical depiction of Jesus. Chalcedon set out, not to explain the person of Christ, but to guard the teachings about His person which are present in scripture. A functional Christological view of His works would no doubt provide a further insight into the mystery; the issue arises, however, that it is profoundly difficult to separate the works of Christ from the Person of Christ. In that regard any statement made of Jesus, is also a statement made of His works and both would fail to reveal all there is. As outlined in this essay, the Chalcedon definition, despite its failure to clarify every aspect of Christ, is wholly biblically accurate.
Bibliography
Allen, Michael, The Christ’s Faith: A Dogmatic Account, (Bloomsbury: London, 2012)
Coakley, Sarah, ‘What does Chalcedon solve and what does it not? Some reflections on the status and meaning of the Chalcedon definition’, in Stephen T. Davis, The Incarnation: An interdisciplinary symposium on the incarnation of the son of God, (Oxford Academic: Oxford, 2002)
Cullman, Oliver, The Christology of the New Testament, (SCM: London, 1963)
Frame, John.M, Systematic theology: An introduction to Christian belief, (P&R: New Jersey, 2013)
Grudem, Wayne, Systematic Theology:An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine, (IVP: Grand rapids, 2020)
Hooker, Morna, The Christian Theology Reader, ed. Alister McGrath (Wiley-Blackwell: London, 2017)
Macleod, Donald, The Person and Work of Christ, (IVP:Illinois, 1998)
Peltier, Robert and Lioy, Dan, ‘Is John’s λογος Christology a polemical response to Philo of Alexandria’s Logos philosophy?’, Conspectus, The Journal of South African Theological Seminary, 28 (2019)
[1] Morna Hooker, The Christian Theology Reader, ed. Alister McGrath (Wiley-Blackwell: London, 2017) [2] Hooker, The Christian Theology reader [3] John M Frame, Systematic theology: An introduction to Christian belief, (P&R: New Jersey, 2013) p877 [4] Frame, Systematic theology, p877 [5] Oliver Cullman, The Christology of the New Testament, (SCM: London, 1963) p4 [6] Frame, Systematic theology p878 [7] Michael Allen, The Christ’s Faith: A Dogmatic Account, (Bloomsbury: London, 2012) p113 [8] Robert Peltier and Dan Lioy, ‘Is John’s λογος Christology a polemical response to Philo of Alexandria’s Logos philosophy?’, Conspectus, The Journal of South African Theological Seminary, 28 (2019) p65-90 [9] Peltier and Lioy, ‘Is John’s λογος Christology..’ p66 [10] Peltier and Lioy, ‘Is John’s λογος Christology’ p81 [11] Sarah Coakley, ‘What does Chalcedon solve and what does it not? Some reflections on the statusand meaning of the Chalcedon definition’, in Stephen T. Davis, The Incarnation: An interdisciplinary symposium on the incarnation of the son of God, (Oxford Academic: Oxford, 2002) p143-163 [12] Coakley, ‘What does Chalcedon solve and what does it not?’ [13] Donald Macleod, The Person and Work of Christ, (IVP:Illinois, 1998) p189 [14] Coakley, ‘What does Chalcedon solve and what does it not?’ [15] Coakley, ‘What does Chalcedon solve and what does it not?’ [16] Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology:An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine, (IVP: Grand rapids, 2020) p683
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